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1. Introduction 
 
Chaotic cryptography describes the use of chaos theory (in particular physical dynamical 
systems working in chaotic regime as part of communication techniques and computation 
algorithms) to perform different cryptographic tasks in a cryptographic system. 
 
Then, we can start by answering the questions: what exactly is chaos?, how is it used in 
cryptography?. First of all, let us say that there is not an universally mathematical accepted 
definition of the term “chaos”. In general sense, it refers to some dynamical phenomena 
considered to be complex (lack of time and spatial order) and unpredictable (erratic). 
Although it was precluded by Poincaré at the end of the XIX century (Poincaré, 1890), chaos 
theory begins to take form in the second half of the XX century (Lorenz, 1963; Mandelbrot, 
1977) after observations of the evolution of different physical systems. These systems 
revealed that despite of the knowledge of their evolution rules and initial conditions, their 
future seemed to be arbitrary and unpredictable. That opened quite a revolution in modern 
physics, terminating with Laplace’s ideas of casual determinism (Laplace, 1825). 
 
Chaos has been observed in nature, in weather and climate (Sneyers, 1997), population 
growth in ecology (May & McLean, 2007), economy (Kyrtsou & Vorlow, 2005), to mention 
only a few examples. It also has been observed in the laboratory in a number of systems 
such as electrical circuits (van der Pol & van der Mark, 1927), lasers (Casperson, 1988), 
chemical reactions, fluid dynamics, mechanical systems, and magneto-mechanical devices.  
 
In essence, chaos theory studies systems that evolve in time presenting three particular 
properties of movement: sensitivity to initial conditions (dynamical instability), stretching 
and folding of the phase space (topological mixing) and aperiodic trajectories arbitrary close 
to an infinite set of periodic orbits (dense orbits). Chaos theory provides the means to 
explain chaos phenomena, and control and make use of chaotic dynamical systems. 
A remarkable characteristic of chaotic systems is their capability of producing quite complex 
patterns of behavior from simple real systems or in simulations from low dimensional 
systems given by a small set of evolution equations. This quality has made them particularly 
useful for application in a wide variety of disciplines, such as biology, economics, 
engineering and others (Cambel, 1993; Kocarev et al., 2009). In these applications, chaotic 
systems are used to produce, simulate, assist or control different processes improving their 
performance or providing a more suitable output. 
 
The use of chaos in cryptography seems quite natural, as its inherent properties connect it 
directly with cryptographic characteristics of confusion and diffusion. This idea is present in 
Shannon’s works (Shannon, 1949), even earlier than the term “chaos” appeared in the 
scientific literature. Additionally, chaotic dynamical systems have the advantage of 
providing qualitatively simple mechanisms to generate deterministic pseudo randomness. 
For cryptography, this could be the promise of producing simpler or better randomness in 
terms of performance (Tenny et al., 2006). 
 
By now, the history of chaos-based cryptography is more than two decades long. First, some 
works appear in the 80’s (Wolfram, 1985; Guan, 1987), but it is in the 90’s, when chaotic 
cryptography really takes off. Two papers mark this beginning (Matews, 1989) and (Pecora, 
1989). The first one proposes a digital stream cipher where a signal generated from a chaotic 
system is used to mask the clear message. The second proposes chaos synchronization to 
mask the clear message with a chaotic signal at the physical level of the communication 
channel and to use synchronization techniques at the receiver to filter the chaotic signal. 
These two papers also open two different views of the application of chaos to cryptography 
that will be later referred as digital or analog techniques (Alvarez & Li, 2006). 
 
Since then, the number of chaotic cryptosystems that have been proposed is too large to be 
covered in this chapter. The interested reader can find a complete and updated view of this 
field in (Kocarev, 2011). In addition, for more recent developments, some work is also 
needed to assess their security. Nevertheless these works have been published in journals of 
physics or engineering; they have revealed the potential of this field, but also a series of 
errors and weak points that need to be overcome. As a consequence, chaotic cryptography 
has been an active research field but with marginal impact in classical cryptography 
(Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001; Amigó, 2009). 
 
In the end, the question is, can chaotic systems provide alternative techniques able to 
enhance cryptographic algorithms?. This chapter can be a worthy material so that the reader 
can find some guides in order to answer himself this question. Thus, the objective of this 
chapter is to give a general vision of what chaotic cryptography is and a comprehensive 
example that illustrates the main techniques used in this field. In it, the authors are intended 
to present a series of selected topics of special interest in this field. 
 
In successive sections of this chapter the reader will be introduced to the following topics: 
fundamentals of chaos, relation between chaos and cryptography, different kinds of chaotic 
cryptosystems and their main characteristics, Pseudo-Random Number Generation (PRNG) 
based on digitized chaos, cipher design based on two dimensional chaotic maps, and the 
corresponding best practices and guidelines required for designing good cryptographic 
algorithms. 
2. Chaos and Cryptography 
 
This section explains the basic concepts of chaos theory. Then, the focus is set on those 
properties that seem relevant for its application to cryptography. In particular, first it is  
given a conceptual introduction to chaotic systems, to follow with a practical approach 
through non-linear dynamical systems. The section concludes considering how chaos theory 
can be useful for cryptographic applications. 
 
2.1 Basic properties of chaotic systems 
Chaos has been observed in numerous natural and laboratory systems (Sneyers, 1997; May, 
1976; Casperson, 1988; Kyrtsou & Vorlow, 2005; van der Pol & van der Mark, 1927) covering 
a substantial number of scientific and engineering areas (physics, biology, meteorology, 
ecology, electronics, computer science and economy, among others). These phenomena, as 
mentioned before, show specific properties that make them complex and unpredictable. 
 
Chaos theory deals with systems that evolve in time to a particular kind of dynamical 
behaviour. As this is a vast mathematical theory, the interested reader is addressed to 
(Robinson, 1995) for a broader introduction. In general, these systems obey a certain set of 
laws of evolution, and so, they are deterministic. It has to be said, that chaos occurs only in 
some deterministic non-linear systems. Explicitly, chaos appears when there is a sustained 
and disorderly-looking long-term evolution that satisfies certain mathematical criteria. 
 
There is a set of properties that summarize the characteristics observed in chaotic systems. 
These are considered the mathematical criteria that define chaos. The most relevant are: 
 
• Dynamic instability: also referred as butterfly effect, it is the property of sensitivity 
to initial conditions, where two arbitrarily closed initial conditions evolve with 
significantly different and divergent trajectories.(Boguta, 2011) 
 
• Topological mixing: intuitively depicted as mixing coloured dyes, it means that 
the system will evolve in time so that any given region of states is always 
transformed or overlaps with any other given region. (Mahieu, 2011) 
 
• Aperiodicity: the system evolves in an orbit that never repeats on itself, that is, 
these orbits are never periodic (Zech et al., 2011). 
 
• Dense periodic orbits: it means that the system follows a dynamics that can 
arbitrarily closely approach every possible asymptotic state. 
 
• Ergodicity: statistical measurements of the variables give similar results no matter 
if they are performed over time or space. Put it in another way, the dynamics 
shows similar statistics when measured over time or space. 
 
• Self-similarity: the evolution of the system, in time or space, shows the same 
appearance at different scales of observation. This characteristic makes the system 
to appear auto-repetitive at different scales of observation (Fabre, 2011) 
 
The references included above show interactive demonstrations of these properties. The 
following section introduces some notions of non-linear dynamical systems. 
2.2 Non-Linear Dynamical Systems (NLDS) 
A dynamical system is a physical phenomenon that evolves in time. In mathematical terms, 
the states of the system are described by a set of variables and its evolution is given by an 
equation and the value of the initial state. This is summarized in Eq. (1), 
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where Xi(t)ЄRN is the coordinate i of the state of the system at instant t, that is X is an N-
dimensional vector with i,j=0,1,…N with N≥1,  F is a parametric function that describes the 
evolution of the system and Λ is the vector of parameters that control the evolution of the 
system. 
 
As chaotic systems only occur in non-linear dynamical systems, F will be considered to be 
non-linear. For digital cryptographic applications we centre our attention on discrete-time 
NLDS. Then, a discrete-time NLDS is given by the following equation:  
 ),(1 Λ=+ ii XFX  (2) 
The significance of the mathematical symbols in Eq. (2) is the same as in Eq. (1) but now the 
time t is discrete. It is observed that this kind of systems is deterministic, thus the time 
evolution of X can be calculated with F and Λ from a given initial state X0. They are also 
recursive, as the next state is calculated from the previous state.  
 
There are a series of concepts or terms that are of special interest in the study of NLDS. The 
first one is the phase space that is the subspace of RN, where all possible states of the system 
are confined: 
 U ⊂ RN  and  F: UU , (3) 
where N is the dimension of the phase space or degree of freedom of the system. The 
evolution in space of an initial state when time passes is called orbit. As we are considering 
F a discrete-time function, the orbits of these systems will be a collection of real pairs of 
numbers: 
 (t0, X0), (t1, F(X0)), … , (ti, Fi(X0)), … (4) 
Then there is the central concept in chaos theory of attractor. The term attractor refers to the 
long-term behavior of the orbits, and it represents the region of phase space where the orbits 
of the system converge after the transitory. The attractor A is a compact region where all 
orbits converge and where the system gets trapped, 
 A⊂ U    and A= F(A) . (5) 
Geometrically, an attractor can be a point, a curve, a manifold, or even a complicated set 
with a fractal structure known as a strange attractor. A brief description of them is given: 
 
• Fixed point, it corresponds to a stationary state of the system. 
 
• Limit cycle, which is associated with a periodic behaviour of the system. Once the 
system enters this attractor the states of the system repeat periodically. 
• Manifold, where there are more than one frequency in the periodic trajectories of 
the system. For example, in the case of two frequencies, the attractor is a 2D-torus. 
 
• Strange attractor, it is informally said to have a complex geometric shape with non-
integer dimension. Any state in the attractor evolves within it and never converges 
to a fixed point, limit cycle or manifold. The dynamics on this attractor is normally 
chaotic, but there exist also strange attractors that are not chaotic. (Mahieu, 2011) 
 
After reviewing the main characteristic of NLDS, one could define the term chaotic system 
as a NLDS that have at least a chaotic strange attractor. 
 
NLDS are usually studied only in a qualitative and computational way, as opposed to the 
study of linear systems, where there is a set of analytical tools (Devaney, 1989). Different 
models of N-dimensional discrete-time mappings have been studied, and under certain 
circumstances complex behaviour in time evolution has been shown. The 1-dimensional 
cases have been deeper analyzed (Collet & Eckmann, 1980), cases of N=2 have also several 
well explored examples (Mira et al., 1996) and (López-Ruiz & Fournier-Prunaret, 2003), but 
as N increases, the complexity grows and less literature is found with a well documented 
analysis of the chaotic properties of the mapping (Fournier-Prunaret et al., 2006). 
 
In chaotic cryptography the behaviour of the dynamical system is fully studied to assess the 
security of the cryptosystem. Due to the nature of NLDS, chaotic cryptography does not 
have analytic tools, as those that exist in classical cryptography. Then, qualitative techniques 
have to be applied in chaotic cryptoanalysis. In particular, the study of the sensitivity to the 
initial conditions and to the control parameters is considered of importance. Normally these 
elements are also a key part of the cryptosystem. 
 
a) Assessing the sensitivity to initial conditions 
Lyapunov exponents are used as a quantifier of the divergence of the orbits in NLDS. N 
exponents can be calculated for a N-dimensional system. These exponents allow us to 
decide if the dynamical system has sensitivity to initial conditions. A system is considered to 
be chaotic when it has a dense aperiodic orbit, and at least the higher of the Lyapunov 
exponents is positive. 
 
The study of the value of Lyapunov exponents as a function of the control parameters 
(vector Λ in Eq. (2)) is a matter of interest as it allows to discover windows of non chaotic 
behaviour of the system, where periodic patterns may appear. 
 
b) Assessing the sensitivity to control parameters 
Chaotic systems are also sensitive to the variation of the control parameters (vector Λ in Eq. 
(2)). This dependence may produce that the dynamics of the system can be completely 
different (chaotic, periodic, divergent, etc...) depending on the values of Λ. A substantial 
change in the dynamics of the system due to a variation of the values of the control 
parameters  is called a bifurcation (Mahieu, 2011). 
 
The bifurcations diagrams are used to study the dynamics of the system as a function of the 
values of Λ. These unfolding diagrams allow knowing the regions of the phase space where 
the system displays chaotic or regular behaviour, depending on the values of the control 
parameters. 
2.3 Connection between Chaos and Cryptography 
As it has been said previously, the main characteristics of chaotic systems make them 
intuitively interesting for their application in cryptography. Here, this connection is 
explored in more detail.  
 
Chaotic systems are implemented with deterministic NLDS, being able to produce the 
deterministic pseudo-randomness required in cryptography. In addition to that, NLDS are 
able to produce complex patterns of evolution. This gives to chaotic systems the algorithmic 
complexity required in cryptographic systems. 
 
Now, let us examine how the inherent properties of chaos connect it directly with 
cryptographic characteristics of confusion and diffusion (Shannon, 1949). Referring to the 
properties discussed of chaotic systems, it is clear that the properties of ergodicity, auto-
similarity, topological mixing are directly connected with confusion. The dynamics in the 
chaotic attractor is given by aperiodic orbits that generate similar statistical patterns. These 
patterns can be used to mask clear messages by means of substitution-like techniques. 
 
On the other hand, diffusion is closely connected with the sensitivity that chaotic systems 
present to initial conditions and control parameters. Diffusion produces the avalanche effect 
where a minimum difference in the input of the cryptosystem gives a completely different 
output. A chaotic system produces this behaviour when a small change is applied to its 
initial conditions or control parameters. The use of these variables as input in the 
cryptosystem algorithm may produce the same avalanche effect. 
 
Table 1 obtained from (Alvarez & Li, 2006), summarizes the connection between chaos and 
cryptography. 
 
Chaotic 
characteristic 
Cryptographic 
property Description 
Ergodicity 
Mixing property 
Auto-similarity 
Confusion 
The output of the system seems similar for any 
intput. 
Sensitivity to initial 
conditions and 
control parameters 
Difusion 
A small diference in the input produces a very 
different output 
Deterministic  Deterministic pseudorandomness 
A deterministic procedure that produces pseudo-
randomness 
Complexity Algorithmic complexity 
A simple algorithm that produces highly complex 
outputs 
 
Table 1. Comparisons of chaotic and cryptographic properties (from Alvarez & Li, 2006). 
 
To conclude, it would be interesting to describe particular potential advantages that chaotic 
cryptosystems may provide to cryptography (Tenny et al., 2006). First of all, chaotic systems 
appear spontaneously in nature and can be directly applied to security processes, as it is the 
case of physical devices used in communications. Those show naturally non-linear and 
chaotic behaviours that can be straightforwardly used to secure communications. 
 
Also chaotic NLDS have the advantage of being implemented with simple computable 
deterministic algorithms. Additionally these algorithms may refer to N-dimensional 
equations or to several systems combined at a time. They could be subject of implantation 
with parallel computing and become faster algorithms. 
3. Chaotic based Cryptosystems 
 
This section presents two specific examples of chaotic based cryptosystems. Full versions of 
them can be found in (Pellicer-Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2008, 2009). These are specially suited 
to illustrate in detail some relevant techniques used in chaotic cryptography. In particular, 
they cover three interesting topics: Pseudo-Random Number Generation (PRNG) based on 
digitized chaos, cipher design based on two-dimensional chaotic maps and the role of 
symmetry and geometry of chaotic maps in encryption algorithms. 
 
Along with that, an introduction provides a global (though not extensive) picture of 
different techniques used in chaotic cryptography. 
 
3.1 Review of chaos based encryption techniques 
The number of chaotic cryptosystems proposed in literature is too large and diverse to be 
covered in this chapter. Valuable overviews with corresponding references can be found in 
(Li, 2003; Kocarev, 2011). It is important as well, to have in mind that it is an active area of 
research and recent developments need some time to assess their security. 
 
To keep this review sufficiently small and clear, it will only cover a general view of the main 
techniques and their basic concepts of operation. See Table 2 for a brief summary of them 
obtained from (Li, 2003). To conclude and provide a comprehensive background, a detailed 
description is dedicated to the specific technique used in the examples described later in this 
section. 
 
CATEGORY METHOD DESCRIPTION 
Analog 
cryptosystems 
Additive chaos 
masking 
A chaotic signal is added to the message. 
Chaotic shift 
keying 
A digital message signal switches among different chaotic systems 
to be added to the message 
Chaotic 
modulation 
A message signal is used to change the parameters or the phase 
space of the chaotic transmitter 
Chaotic 
Control 
A message signal is ciphered in a classical way and used to 
perturbate the chaotic system 
Digital 
cryptosystems 
Stream ciphers 
Chaotic PRNG A chaotic signal generates a pseudorandom 
sequence (keystream) to XORed the message 
Chaotic 
Inverse System 
approach 
A message signal is added to the output of 
the chaotic signal, which has been feeded by 
the ciphered message signal in previous 
instants 
Block ciphers 
Backwards 
iterative 
A block of a clear message is ciphered using 
of inverse chaotic systems 
Forwards 
iterative 
A block of ciphered message is obtained by 
pseudoramdom permutations obtained from a 
chaotic system 
S-Boxes An S-Box is created from the chaotic system. 
There can be dynamic or static S-Boxes 
Miscellaneous 
Searching 
based chaotic 
ciphers 
A table of characters is generated from a 
chaotic system. The table is used to cipher 
the characters of the message text 
Cell. Automata The chaotic system is a Cellular Automata 
 
Table 2. Different kinds of chaos based cryptosystems presented in literature (Li, 2003). 
As it is seen in Table 2, the application of chaotic systems to cryptography has followed two 
main approaches. These have been called, analogue and digital techniques (Alvarez & Li, 
2006). Let us discuss in further detail their principal concepts and features of operation. 
 
a) Analogue chaos-based cryptosystems 
These systems are mostly used to secure communications and have attracted very extensive 
research activity lately (Larson et al., 2006). In them, the clear message is masked with a 
chaotic signal at physical level of the communication channel. The natural non-linearity of 
electric and optical communication devices is controlled to produce a chaotic waveform that 
modulates the message in a secure way for transmission. At the receiver, chaotic 
synchronization techniques demodulate the signal and produce the clear message. Though 
no completely secure their implementation results straightforward. 
 
Main techniques of chaotic modulation (Yang, 2004), described in Table 2, are shown in Fig.1  
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Modulation techniques used in analogue chaotic cryptosystems (Yang, 2004). 
 
Typically used in optical communications with high rates of transmission, synchronization 
techniques become critical, also due to the fact that chaotic performance implies highly 
sensitivity to small deviations. Here, a chaotic control signal is used to provide a 
synchronous performance of transmitter and receiver. Though not necessary to be equal 
(Femat et al., 2005), they require careful fabrication and operation within specific conditions. 
 
These systems are not cryptographically secure (Larson et al., 2006), due intrinsic limitations 
of their design. As it has been seen in previous section, chaotic signals are deterministic and 
though they appear to be random, they are intrinsically correlated. This means that patterns 
can be found in the communication signals that may allow an attacker to decipher the 
message. Even though, their technical complexity and high transmission rates makes them 
valuable for communications that only require security for a limited period of time. 
 
b) Digital chaos-based cryptosystems 
These cryptosystems are basically algorithms implemented in digital circuits or computers. 
These algorithms are based in iterative computations of chaotic functions that produce 
digital signals. Then, basic cryptographic operations (substitution and mixing) are used to 
mask the clear message with the chaotic signals. These cryptosystems involve one or more 
chaotic systems in the algorithm and use their initial conditions and/or control parameters 
as secret keys. 
But chaos implemented on computers with finite precision  may diverge from real-precision 
chaos. This is why it is normally called “pseudo chaos”. In pseudo chaos, the chaotic 
properties of the system may suffer dynamical degradation, for pseudo orbits may depart 
from the real ones in many manners (Guckenheimer & Holmes, 1983; Li, 2003; Li et al, 2005). 
Even so, it is possible for these pseudo chaotic systems, to minimize their dynamical 
degradation. In this direction, the idea of using high dimensional chaotic systems may also 
be helpful. While less known, these systems whirl many variables at any calculation and the 
periodic patterns produced by the finite precision are diminished (Falcioni et al., 2005). 
Anyway, only a detailed study of the dynamical system may guarantee their performance. 
 
Main techniques used here are algorithms that implement stream or block ciphers (Li, 2003). 
Understanding by them, the encryption of individual bits or blocks at a time, respectively. 
There are also miscellaneous systems that use characteristic techniques or systems and 
belong to specific families. As for security, cryptographers demand more rigorous studies of 
security in publications (Alvarez & Li, 2006). Also the novelty of chaotic cryptography 
shows a lack of tools for cryptanalysis as the ones of classical cryptography (Amigó, 2009). 
 
c) Digital stream ciphers implemented with chaotic PRBG 
Pseudo Random Bit Generation (PRBG) is a topic of high interest. As it is shown in Table 2, 
these are used in stream cipher encryption but they are also a subject of broad application in 
many scientific and engineering areas. This is why, since 1990 the proposals of chaos based 
PRBG have demonstrated great development (Kovarev, 2001; Kocarev & Jakimoski, 2003). 
 
To build a chaotic PRBG, we take an N-dimensional deterministic discrete-time dynamical 
system. As seen in Eq. (2), it is an iterative map f : RN → RN  of the form: 
 Xk+1 = F(Xk,Λ) (6) 
where k = 0, 1,…, n. is the discrete time, Λvector of parameters, X0 initial condition and 
X1,…, Xn  states of the system in the following instants of time. Then it is necessary to 
construct a numerical algorithm that transforms the states of the system into binary 
numbers. Additionally not all states of the orbit are used to produce the pseudo-random 
sequence. Normally the orbit is sampled in order to get rid of the correlation existent 
between consecutive states. The existing designs of chaotic PRBGs use different techniques 
to pass from the continuum to the binary world (Li, 2003). The most relevant are: 
 
• Extracting bits from each state along the chaotic orbits (Protopopescu, 1995; 
Bodgan et al., 2007; Fournier-Prunaret &Abdel-Kaddous, 2012). 
 
• Dividing the phase space into m sub-spaces, and output a binary number i = 0, 
1,…,m if the chaotic orbit visits the i-th subspace (Stojanovski &Kocarev, 2001; 
Suneel,2009). 
 
• Combining the outputs of two or more chaotic systems to generate the pseudo-
random numbers (Li et al, 2001; Po et al., 2003). 
 
The binary sequence generated with the chaotic PRBG algorithm is used as a keystream. To 
mask the clear message, the keystream is added to it through a binary XOR operation. The 
initial conditions and the vector of parameters are used as the secret key. 
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3.2 First example: Building a stream cipher based on 2D chaotic maps 
This subsection presents an asymmetric or secret key chaotic cryptosystem. It describes a 
chaotic digital stream cipher. Its nucleus is a Pseudo-Random Bit Generation (PRBG) based 
on 2D chaotic mappings of logistic type (Pellicer-Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2008). This chaotic 
PRBG produces pseudorandom binary sequences out of the chaotic dynamics of the 
considered maps. The sequences produced are used as the keystream in the cipher. 
 
To illustrate its implementation and functionality, the design of the chaotic PRBG algorithm 
is fully described and different evaluations are presented, such as statistical tests, 
predictability and speed measurements. Considering the application of this PRBG in 
cryptography, the size of the available key space is also calculated.  
 
First let us see the chaotic systems that are going to be used in this example. In (López-Ruiz 
& Pérez-García, 1991) the authors analyze a family of three chaotic systems obtained by 
coupling two logistic maps. The focus here will be made on models (a) and (b), which will 
be referred as System A and B: 
 
 
                  (7) 
 
The interest of using these systems is their symmetry properties (TA(x,y) = TB(y,x) and 
T2A(x,y) = T2B (x,y)) wich will be of used in 3.3 to improve the algorithm. From a geometrical 
point of view, both present the same chaotic attractor in the interval λЄ [1.032  1.0843]. The 
parameter λ in Eq. (2), could be considered different for the calculus of x and y coordinates. 
This would give two independent control parameters λx and λy, which in a similar rank 
[1.032, 1.0843] maintain the system in a chaotic regime due to its structural stability. The 
dynamics in this regime (Pellicer-Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2011a) is particularly interlaced 
around the saddle point P4: 
 
  P4=[P4x, P4y]       (8) 
 
Despite of the similarities of these systems, their dynamics have some differences. In Fig. 2 
one can see one orbit and its spectrum for both systems with equal initial conditions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Chaotic Attractor with λ= 1.07 , X0=[0.737,0.747] for System A in (a). Orbit  x(n) and 
spectrum S(w) for and Systems A and B in (b) and (c) respectively for the same λ and X0. 
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Second, let us present the algorithm used to obtain the Symmetric Coupled Logistic Map 
PRBG. In (Suneel, 2009) the author presents an algorithm to build a PRBG based on a 2D 
chaotic system, the Hénon map (Hénon, 1976; Pellicer-Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2011b). This 
algorithm is based on the technique of subspace division. The pseudorandom sequences 
generated with this algorithm show good random properties when subjected to different 
statistical tests. The author indicates that the choice of the Hénon map is rather arbitrary and 
similar results should also be attainable with other 2D maps. This algorithm is then taken 
and the chaotic Hénon map is substituted by the Symmetric Coupled Logistic Map. 
 
But, as it normally happens in chaotic cryptosystems, this algorithm is dependent of the 
chaotic system and the mere substitution of the chaotic systems is not enough to maintain its 
performance (Li, 2003). In particular, it is found that the sub-space division method has also 
to be adapted to fit the geometrical characteristics of the new chaotic systems. In (Pellicer-
Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2008) the interested reader can find these details. The final algorithm 
applied to the Symmetric Coupled Logistic Maps is shown in Fig.3 through a functional 
diagram. In the following paragraphs the details of its implementation are described.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Functional block structure of the proposed algorithm (example for System A) 
 
The input of the algorithm are a state of initial conditions X0.= [x0,y0] and a value of the 
parameters (λx, λy). The functional block named as Logistic Bimap produces a series of 
iterations through Eq.(4). Whenever the initial input values produce chaotic regime this 
block produces a chaotic sequence of 2D real states Xi.= [xi,yi]. Then, it is used the technique 
of dividing the phase space in four sub-spaces to transform the 2D states into binary vectors 
[biX, biY]. This is done in the block named as sub-space decision. This produces two binary 
sequences SX = {biX}∞i=1  and SY = {biY}∞i=1. 
 
As it is said before, the division of the phase space in four sub-spaces must be defined, in a 
way that the Logistic Bimap system visits each subspace as the Hénon map does in (Suneel, 
2009). A finite automata that summarizes the pattern of visits is used to obtain that. A finite  
automata is inferred from the Hénon map in (Suneel, 2009) and a division of sub-paces is 
chosen in the Logistic Bimaps in order to get the same finite automata. In particular, if we 
name the sub-spaces corresponding to [biX , biY] with values [0, 0], [1, 0], [0, 1] and [1, 1] as 
1,2,3 and 4, we can analyze the detail of this pattern of visits. This is shown in Fig.4. 
In (Suneel, 2009) the Hénon map does not visit the four sub-spaces equally. It is observed 
that there exists a symmetry of movements between sub-spaces 1-3 and 2-4, which has a 
characteristic mixing of 50% and 50%, as long as a predominant (80%) and constant 
transition between 3 and 2. This leads to a highly variation of binary values in sequences Sx, 
Sy. In the end, these conditions give the final result of an output sequence O(j) with a proper 
balance of zeros and ones, or put it in another way, with pseudo-random properties. 
 
To get this automata for the symmetric coupled logistic maps Systems A and B, one should 
chose the diagonal axis, which divides phase space in two parts, each of which is equally 
visited (50%). And additional statistical calculus is required to divide these two sub-spaces, 
in another two with a visiting rate of 40%-10% each one. When this is done, one can observe 
that this is got by merely selecting P4 and the line perpendicular to the axis in P4 as the 
other division line. 
 
The final sub-space division for each system is presented in Fig. 4(a) and 4(c), along with the 
indications of the evolution of the visits to each sub-space. For Systems A and B, this finite 
automata is depicted in Fig. 4(b) and 4(d). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. (a) Final sub-space division and (b) finite automata for System A. (c) Final sub-space 
division and (d) finite automata for System B. (In both cases, λ = 1.07). 
 
Finally the operation performed in the sub-space decision block is summarized in Eq (5): 
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After obtaining SX = {biX}∞i=1  and SY = {biY}∞i=1, they are sampled with a frequency of 1/P 
(each P iterations) and BX = {bP*iX}∞i=1  and BY = {bP*iY}∞i=1 are obtained. The effect of skipping 
P consecutive values of the orbit is necessary to get a random macroscopic behaviour. With 
this operation, the correlation existing between consecutive values generated by the chaotic 
system is eliminated. 
 
This is done in a way that over a Pmin, sequences generated with P > Pmin will appear 
macroscopically random. Although P is normally introduced as an additional key 
parameter in pseudo-random sequences generation (Kocarev, 2001), it strongly determines 
the speed of the generation algorithm, so it is recommended to be kept as small as possible. 
The output binary pseudorandom sequence O(j) is obtained by a mixing operation of the 
actual and previous values of the sequence B(j) = [BX(j);BY(j)] given by the truth table 
sketched in Table 3. 
 
 BY(j-1) 
BY(j-2) 0 1 
0 BX(j) Not(BX(j)) 
1 BY (j) Not(BY(j)) 
 
Table 3. Truth table generating the binary sequence O(j). 
 
As a direct application for cryptography, the above described PRBG could be used in the 
construction of a stream cipher. Different initial conditions, x0 and y0 and parameters λ and 
P, can be applied to the input of the system and be used as a key to generate the keystream, 
or output sequence O(j). The keystream O(j) can be XORed directly with a clear text, 
obtaining that way the ciphertext. 
 
In rest of this example, we evaluate the functionality of the chaotic PRBG with the calculus 
of the size of the key space, applying statistical and predictability tests to different sequences 
produced with it and measuring its speed. 
 
a) Calculus of the key space 
Let us determine the operative range of initial conditions and parameters values that can be 
applied to the PRBG in Fig. 3. This range, when the PRBG is used in cryptography 
applications is known as the key-space. Then, the key space is determined by the interval of 
the parameter and the initial conditions that keep the dynamical system in the chaotic 
regime. These are λ∈ [1.032, 1.0843], x0∈ (0, 1) and y0∈(0, 1). The parameter λ can be 
considered as two independent parameters λx y λy, and the dynamic properties of the 
system still remain chaotic in the same interval. The sampling parameter can also be 
considered as another parameter of the key space. One must observe that P should be kept 
in a suitable range, so that the PRBG is fast enough for its desired application. These 
intervals can be denoted with brackets and calculated as [λx]= [λy]=0.0523, [x0]=1, [y0]=1 y 
[P]=890, when taking [P]∈[110,1000] as the functional range of the sampling factor. 
 
The size of the key space will be determined by the numeric representation used in the 
calculus of the algorithm. If floating-point representation under standard IEEE 754 is 
chosen, the smallest available precision is ε32≈1.1921×10-7 for simple precision with 32 bits 
and ε64≈2.2204×10-16for double precision with 64 bits. These quantities give the maximum 
number of possible values of every parameter in any of the two representations. This is 
easily computed dividing the intervals by ε, as Kλx=[λ x]/ε, Kλy=[λ y]/ε, Kx0=[x0]/ε, Ky0=[y0]/ε, 
and KP=[P]. Notice that the calculus of KP is different as P can only take integer values.  
 
The total size of possible parameter values is given by K, calculated as K=Kλx× 
Kλy×Kx0×Ky0×KP . K is the size of the available key-space and its logarithm in base 2 gives us 
the available length of binary keys or entries to produce pseudo-random sequences in the 
generator. The values obtained for each number precision, are K32=1.21×1028, with a key 
length of 93 bits for single precision and K64=1.00×1063, with a key length of 209 bits for 
double precision. 
These results are fine for the use of the chaotic PRBG in cryptography, where a length of 
keys greater than 100 is considered strong enough against brute force attacks, (Alvarez & Li, 
2006). Nevertheless, it has to be said for accuracy’s sake of that the calculus of the key space 
is a coarse estimation and a deeper study is required (Alvarez & Li, 2006) for accurate 
evaluation. The high sensitivity to parameter values and initial conditions of chaotic systems 
may produce windows on periodicity in the key space. Another possibility is that the 
dynamics can diverge towards infinity. In the systems presented here an initial calculus of 
100 iterations is enough to ensure the boundless or goodness of the initial conditions. 
 
a) Statistical testing 
In general, randomness cannot be mathematically proved. Alternatively, different statistical 
batteries of tests have been proposed over time to assess randomness. Each of these tests 
evaluates a relevant random property expected in a true random generator. Then, to test a 
certain randomness property in a PRBG, several output sequences are taken from the 
generator. As one knows a priori the statistical distribution of possible values that true 
random sequences would be likely to exhibit for that property, a conclusion can be obtained 
upon the probability of the tested sequences to be random. 
 
There exist different well-known sources of test suites available in literature, such as those 
described by Knuth (Knuth, 1997), the Marsaglias Diehard test suite (Marsaglia, 1995) or 
those of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Rukhin et al., 2010). But 
there are many more (Rütti et al, 2004; Mascagni, 1999), perhaps not so nicely packaged, but 
still useful. In these collections of tests, each test tries a different random property and gives 
a way of interpreting its results. In this example, the Diehard test suite (Marsaglia, 1995) and 
the NIST Test Suite (Rukhin et al., 2010) were selected, for they are very accessible and 
widely used. Table 4 lists the tests comprised in these suites. 
 
Ner Diehard test suite NIST test suite 
1 Birthday spacings  Frequency (monobit) 
2 Overlapping 5-permutation  Frequency test within a block 
3 Binary rank test Cumulative sums 
4 Bitstream  Runs 
5 OPSO Longest run of ones in a block 
6 OQSO Binary matrix rank 
7 DNA Discrete fourier transform 
8 Count-the-1’s test  Non-overlapping template matching 
9 A parking lot Overlapping template matching 
10 Minimum distance Maurer’s universal statistical 
11 3D-spheres Approximate entropy 
12 Squeeze  Random excursions 
13 Overlapping sums Random excursions variant 
14 Runs Serial 
15 Craps Linear complexity 
 
Table 4. List of tests comprised in the Diehard and NIST test suites. 
 
In each test, a p-value is obtained. This value summaries the strength of evidence against the 
randomness of the tested sequence. In Marsaglia’s Diehard test suite, p-values should lie 
within the interval [0, 1) to accept the PRBG. In NIST Statistical Test Suite, the acceptance 
happens when the p-values are greater than α, the significance level of the test. 
To assess the randomness of the PRBG obtained in the previous section with systems A and 
B, several sequences are obtained and submitted to the Diehard and NIST test suites 
described in Table 4. The significance level of the tests was set to a value appropriate for 
cryptographic applications (α= 0.01). Similar results were found for both systems and for 
simplicity, only those obtained with system A will be presented here after. Ten sequences 
were generated with six different sets of initial conditions and considering λ = λx = λy. Their 
characteristics are described in Table 5. 
 
Sequence S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
x0 0.9891 0.4913 0.6727 0.7268 0.3956 0.9998 
y0 0.6891 0.6913 0.4977 0.9018 0.4956 0.6498 
λ 1.048 1.053 1.069 1.080 1.064 1.074 
PDmin 55 45 35 47 n.a. n.a. 
PNmin 83 105 83 83 100 85 
 
Table 5. Parameters PDmin and PNmin for different sequences Si , i = 1,…,6, with different 
initial conditions (x0, y0) and control parameter λ. 
 
Six of them (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 and S6) were tested with Nist tests suite with 200 Mill. of bits 
and four of them (S1, S2, S3 and S4) were tested with Diehard tests suite with 80 Mill. of 
bits. Here, the parameters PDmin and PNmin are the minimum sampling rate or shift factor, 
Pmin, over which, all sequences generated with the same initial conditions and P > Pmin pass 
Diehard or Nist tests suites, respectively. It is observed here, that the Nist tests suite requires 
a higher value of Pmin and that S5 and S6 were not tested with Diehard battery of tests. 
 
In the Diehard tests suite, each of the tests returns one or several p-values which should be 
uniform in the interval [0,1) when the input sequence contains truly independent random 
bits. The software available in (Marsaglia, 1995) provides a total of 218 p-values for 15 tests, 
and the uniformity requirement can be assessed graphically, when plotting them in the 
interval [0,1). For example Fig. 5 shows the p-values obtained for three sequences (a),(b) and 
(c) with the same initial conditions S1, and different sampling factor P. The first one, Fig. 
5(a), demonstrates graphically the failure of the tests, for there is a non-uniform clustering of 
p-values around the value 1.0. Fig. 5(b) shows the uniformity obtained with PDmin= 55 over 
the interval [0,1). A better uniformity can be appreciated when P > PDmin in Fig. 5(c). 
Sequences S1 to S4 where proved to pass the Diehard battery of tests with significance level 
α= 0.01. Fig. 5(d) presents a graphical representation of the p-values obtained for each 
sequence with sampling factor P=PDmin of Table 6. It can be observed that some p-values are 
occasionally near 0 or 1. Although it can not be well appreciated in the figure, it has to be 
said that those never really reach these values. 
 
In the Nist tests suite, one or more p-values are also returned for each sequence under test. 
These values should be greater than the significance level a, which was selected as α=0.01 
(as in the Diehard case). These tests also require a sufficiently high length of sequences and 
to prove randomness in one test, two conditions should be verified. First, a minimum 
percentage of sequences should pass the test and second, the p-values of all sequences 
should also be uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1). For this case, each of the six 
sequences with initial conditions S1 to S6 are arranged in 200 sub-sequences of 1Mill. bits 
each and submitted to the Nist battery of tests. Sequences Si proved to pass all tests over a 
minimum value PNmin, shown in Table 5. 
In Fig.5(e) and 5(f), the results obtained for S1 and S4 respectively are graphically presented, 
as an example of what was obtained for each Si. The tests in the suite are numbered 
according to Table 4. Fig. 5(e) represents the percentage of the 200 sub-sequences of S1 that 
pass each of the 15 tests of the suite. These percentages are over the minimum pass rate 
required of 96.8893% for a sample size of 200 binary sub-sequences. 
 
Fig. 5(f) describes the uniformity of the distribution of p-values obtained for the 15 tests of 
the suite. Here, uniformity is assessed. The interval (0, 1) is divided in ten subintervals 
(C1,C2,…,C10) and the number of p-values that lay in each sub-interval, among a total of 
200, are counted and proved to be uniform. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Diehard test suite p-values obtained for initial conditions S1 with (a) P = 20 , (b) P = 
PDmin= 55 and (c) P = 110. In (d), p-values obtained for initial conditions S1, S2, S3 and S4 
with P= PDmin of Table 5. NIST test results, in (e) the proportion of sub-sequences of S1 that 
passes each test, in (f) the distribution of p-values of S4 is examined for each test to ensure 
uniformity. 
 
The results above obtained are finally compared with the ones produced by other standard 
PRBG. To do that, two generators provided in the software packet of Diehard (Marsaglia, 
1995) are submitted to the statistical tests. 
 
The first one is the shift-register, generator number 13 with parameters L1= 13, R=17 and 
L2=5. The second one is a extended congruential generator; the first one provided in the 
packet with seeds 78, 29 and 33. These generators produced sequences two sequences of 11 
Mill. of bytes, more than 80 Mill. bits. Another two generators given in NIST (Rukhin et al., 
2010) were also used to produce another two standard pseudorandom sequences. In 
particular two sequences of 200 Mill. bits were produced with the ANSI X9.17(3-DES) and 
the linear congruential generator. 
The results obtained for these standard generators are similar to the ones obtained with the 
Symmetric Coupled Logistic Map PRBG and they are presented in Fig.6. Only one of the 
standard generators shows poorer performance than the chaotic PRBG. This is the shift-
register generator that fails with p-value=1 the following tests: binary rank test and count-
the-1’s test. 
 
  
 
  
 
Fig. 6. Diehard test suite p-values obtained sequence generated with the chaotic PRBG and 
initial conditions S1 and P=110 (circles) and for the sequence generated with the standard 
generators (stars). (a) The shift register. (b) The extended congruential generator. (c) 
Proportion of sub-sequences that passes each one of NIST tests with generator ANSI X9.17 
(black cross) and linear congruential generator (asterisk) and chaotic PRBG (circles) with 
initial conditions S1 and P=50 (c) or P=90 (d). 
 
c) Predictability testing 
A PRBG is called a cryptographically secure pseudorandom bit generator (CSPRBG) when is 
not predictable. [Menezes et al, 1996]. To assess the unpredictability it is necessary to pass 
any of the following tests: the polynomial-time statistical test or the next-bit test. Both tests 
are equivalent. 
 
A PRBG passes the first one if no polynomial-time algorithm can correctly distinguish 
between an output sequence of the generator and a truly random sequence of the same 
length with probability significantly greater than 0.5. A PRBG passes the next-bit test if there 
is no polynomial-time algorithm which, on input of the first L bits of a generated sequence s, 
can predict the (L + 1)st bit of s with probability negligible greater than 0.5 (a function is 
negligible if it is eventually smaller than the inverse of any positive polynomial). As it is not 
possible to prove the non existence of something, a generator is considered to pass these 
tests if it is possible to verify the above conditions under some plausible but unproved 
mathematical assumption. 
Conventional cryptography has a framework of concepts and techniques that allows 
conclude on predictability, based on number and computation theories. In chaotic 
cryptography one may expect predictability to be a function of the dynamical parameters of 
the chaotic system. However, here there is a lack of theoretical tools to carry out such kind 
of analysis. In return, one can perform empirical measurements. 
 
This part presents several measurements to assess the predictability of the PRBG. These will 
show, that due to the characteristics of the design of the PRBG, the probability of producing 
a 0 or a 1 at a given instant t=j is: 
 P(O(j)=1) = P(O(j)=0) = 0.5+Δε (6) 
and the maximum value of Δε will be measured (Δεmax). 
 
To do that, the chaotic PRBG algorithm is revised. The conditions necessary for 
unpredictability are analyzed. After that, a binary pseudorandom sequence is generated, the 
probability of obtaining a 0 or a 1 bits is measured on that sequence and the error magnitude 
Δε is evaluated. Our discussion is centred in System A, but measurements could also be 
performed to System B the same way and similar results should be obtained. 
 
The design of the generator is depicted in Fig.3. There it can be seen that the output bit 
generated at instant t=j, O(j) is generated by means of Table 4 as a function of the binary 
vectors BY(j-1) , BY(j-2) y B(j) = [BX(j),BY(j)] where at instant t=j=P*i, BX(j)= bP*iX  y BY(j)= 
bP*iY . As a result the output bit is produced explicitly as it is shown in following Table 7. 
 
 [BX(j),BY(j)] 
[BY(j-2),BY(j-1)]) [0,0] [0,1] [1,0] [1,1] 
[0,0] 0 0 1 1 
[0,1] 1 1 0 0 
[1,0] 0 1 1 0 
[1,1] 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 6. Truth table generating the output bit O(j). 
 
From Table 6 one observes that the output O(j) will have a 0.5 probability of being a 0 or 1 
bit whenever the probabilities of the vectors BY(j-1) , BY(j-2) y B(j) = [BX(j);BY(j)] are also 0.5. 
And we can say that the distribution of  0’s and 1’s the output binary sequence will be 
uniform as long as the distribution of the sequence of the binary vector B(j) = [BX(j);BY(j)] is 
uniform. 
 
But B(j) is obtained in the output of the sub-space division block, as t=j=P*i, BX(j)= bP*iX  
and BY(j)= bP*iY,  and as it was seen the pattern of visits of any sub-space is not uniform, it 
depends of the dynamic of the chaotic attractor. The dynamic of visits of every sub-space is 
analyzed in Fig. 7. 
  
In Fig.7, it is observed that the sequences of binary vectors [biX , biY]  in (a) and [bP*iX , bP*iY] 
in (b) have a characteristic evolution. In particular, from the Fig.7 (a) is easy to conclude that 
it is possible to predict next states in the automata given and initial state for P=1. For 
example P([biX , biY] =[0,0])/([bi-1X , bi-1Y] = [1,0])=1. On the other hand, in Fig.7 (b) this 
sequence is sampled at P rate, when P is taken sufficiently high, P>>1. Then, the correlation 
of the states in the chaotic system disappears and any transition is possible. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Finite automata for the evolution dynamics of binary vector [bP*iX , bP*iY] generated in 
the chaotic PRBG with system A (a) when P=1 and (b) when P>>1.  
 
To measure the predictability, different binary sequences are produced in the chaotic PRBG 
with initial conditions S2 of Table 5, a length of n=2Mill of bits and different values of 
sampling factor P=1, 101 y 151. With these sequences, it is measured the probability of 
transition from a state B(j-1) = [BX(j-1),BY(j-1)] at instant t=j-1 to the state B(j) = [BX(j),BY(j)] 
in the next instant. These measurements can be seen in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 7. Measurements of the probability of transition from one subspace to another.  
Table 7 shows two tables for every value of P used in the measurements. The table on the 
left counts the visits or transitions from the sub-space where B(j-1) = [BX(j-1),BY(j-1)] was at 
instant t=j-1 to the sub-space where [BX(j),BY(j)] is at the following instant. The table on the 
right calculates the probability of transition between the four subspaces calculated from the 
table on the left. The values in the different tables are obtained in (a), (b) with P=1, in (c), (d) 
P=101, and in (e), (f) P= 151. As a conclusion of these, it is found that the system at instant 
t=j has the following probabilities for being in any of the four possible states:  
 P([BX(j),BY(j)]=[0,0])= P(([BX(j),BY(j)=[1,1])=  0.1  (10) 
 P([BX(j),BY(j)]=[0,1])= P(([BX(j),BY(j)=[1,0])= 0.4 
It is observed that the greater the value of P, the closer the probabilities to 0.5. The case 
where P=151 is then considered to proceed with the measurements. Now it is possible to 
calculate from Table 7 the probability of obtaining BX(j) = 0 or BX(j)=1 from a given 
predecessor state B(j-1) = [BX(j-1),BY(j-1)]. And the same for the probabilities of BY(j) = 0 or 
BY(j)=1  from the state B(j-1) . These calculus can be done by the reader in all cases with the 
data of Table 7(f), but here the first one is illustrated as an example: 
  P(BX(j) = 0/B(j-1)=[0,0]) = 0,116866* P(B(j-1)=[0,0])+ 0,383689* P(B(j-1)=[0,0])= 
  0,500555* P(B(j-1)=[0,0])  (11) 
All results are summarized in Table 8, where Δε is the deviasion from probability 0.5: 
 
 
 
Table 8. Calculus of the probability of obtaining from the estate B(j-1) = [BX(j-1),BY(j-1)] (a) 
BX(j) = 0 or BX(j)=1 and (b)  BY(j) = 0 or BY(j)=1.  
 
From Table 8 it can be seen that: 
 P(BX(j) = 0) ≈ P(BX(j) = 1) ≈ P(BY(j) = 0) ≈ P(BY(j) = 1) = 0.5 ±Δε (12) 
The error Δε is different in each case of Eq. (12). To get this equation we have taken the 
approximations of Eq. (13) for all cases: 
 P(BX(j) = 0) ≈ 0.5 * (P([BX(j-1)/BY(j-1)=[0,0])+ P([BX(j-1)/BY(j-1)=[0,1])+ 
  P([BX(j-1)/BY(j-1)=[1,0])+ P([BX(j-1)/BY(j-1)=[1,1])) ≈ 0.5 ±Δε (13) 
Considering all cases, we obtain that Δε<0.0006. This result can be compared with the the 
acuracy of this measurement δ=1/n= 5x10-7, where n is the length of the sequence. Finally it 
can be concluded that the distribution of the binary vector B(j) is uniform with an error of 
Δεmax<0.0006. And from Table 8 we conclude that the probability of producing a bit 0 or 1 
given a sequence S2 of n=2Mill bits is almost 0.5 within a maximum error of Δεmax<0.0006. 
This gives a quantitative magnitude of the chaotic PRBG’s predictability. 
d) Performance Test 
To assess the functionality of the PRBG for its use in cryptography, it is necessary to 
measure its speed. As it is said, an allegedly “secure” cipher is not acceptable for real 
applications if it is not efficient. 
 
To establish the complexity, and consequently the performance of the chaotic PRBG, the 
principle of invariance is observed. This says that the efficiency of one algorithm in different 
execution environments differs only in a multiplicative constant, when the values of the 
parameters of cost are sufficiently high. In this case, the asymptotic behavior of the 
computational cost of the PRBG is governed by the calculus performed in the chaotic block 
of Fig.3. This block makes P iterations for each output bit, O(j). The capital theta notation 
(Θ) can be used to describe an asymptotic tight bound for the magnitude of cost of the 
PRBG. And consequently, the 2D symmetric coupled logistic maps have a computational 
cost or complexity of order Θ(P*n). This result is typical in chaotic based cryptosystems 
where multiple iterations are required for each encryption step. In this case the number of 
iterations required for good statistical quality is around 100 iterations and this can be 
considered small compared with other cryptosystems ( Examples: larger than 250 or 65536 
in (Kocarev, 2001)). Nevertheless in our case, the calculus is two dimensional and two real 
variables are computed for each step. 
 
To measure the speed of the chaotic PRBG the following test is performed: the algorithm is 
implemented in C++ code with the compiler Bloodshed C++ 4.9.9.2 and run in PC with 
Windows 2000 5.00.2195 SP4 - Intel Pentium 4 - CPU 2.80GHz – 515.056 KB RAM. 
Generally speaking, on a PC with a fz Hz CPU, it is acceptable if the encryption speed is fz/a 
bps, where a <=100 (Alvarez & Li, 2006). In our case the chaotic PRBG gives a speed of 
a=2394 if P=25 and a=4219 when P=47. 
 
The results obtained show no optimal performance, but as it is known (Alvarez & Li, 2006) 
besides the CPU frequency, the encryption speed of a software implementation is tightly 
dependent on other issues, such as the CPU structure, the memory size, the underlying OS 
platform, the developing language, all options of the compiler, and so on. In consequence 
one could say that this speed needs to be increased with code optimization. In this case, 
among other things, it could be convenient to use hardware implementations with parallel 
mechanisms for calculating simultaneously each variable of the 2D chaotic iterations. 
 
3.3 Second example: Improving encryption with symmetry swap of chaotic variables 
In this example it is explored how the geometric and symmetric characteristics of the chaotic 
maps can be used to improve the encryption algorithm. In particular, these characteristics 
are studied in the chaotic logistic bimap attractors and a mechanism called “symmetry-
swap” (Pellicer-Lostao & López-Ruiz, 2009) is introduced to enhance the previous PRBG. It 
is shown that this mechanism can increase the degrees of freedom of the key space, while 
maintaining the performance of the PRBG algorithm. 
 
Let us observe that the maps under consideration present symmetry with respect to the 
diagonal axis. Now let us consider a point [x0, y0] and its conjugated [y0, x0] with respect to 
the diagonal [x0, y0] as two different initial conditions. It can be seen, that starting from any 
of these points systems A and B produce different but symmetric orbits (conjugated orbits). 
Now it becomes clear that an interchange (or swap) of coordinates x and y in an orbit state 
will to produce a jump to a conjugated orbit, while the attractor and the chaotic regime are 
not affected. These facts are illustrated in the schematic diagram of Fig. 8 for Systems A and 
B. When starting with the same initial conditions, one orbit and its conjugated are presented, 
jumping from one to the other is possible thanks to the swapping factor. 
 
  
 
Fig. 8. Five points in the evolution of trajectories for System A (a) or B (b) when starting with 
λ= 1.07 and the Same Initial Conditions [x0, y0] (point 0 with the star-marker) and its 
Coordinate Conjugated [y0,  x0] (point 0 with the circle-marker). 
 
In these circumstances, a swapping of coordinates could be introduced in the algorithm of 
Fig. 3, without altering its pseudorandom properties. This mechanism is named by the 
authors as “symmetry-swap”. In practice, the s symmetry-swap can be an additional step at 
the input of the system, which is applied at specific instants t=i-1 as desired. When the 
swapping is applied at a constant rate S, a swap of coordinates is introduced every S 
iterations and the algorithm has the following performance: the map evolves along one 
specific orbit during S iterations and after a swap in the coordinates (swapping x↔y), the 
map jumps to a conjugated orbit. Let us call S the rate of swapping or the swapping factor. 
 
a) Calculus of the key space 
It is important to observe at this point, that the introduction of a swapping factor S does not 
penalizes the computational cost of the resulting PRBG. The chaotic block again dominates 
its asymptotic behavior. As a result, the swapped 2D symmetric coupled logistic maps 
PRBGs have an asymptotic tight bound of order Θ(P*n). Then we must expect a similar 
performance as for the algorithm in the first example. Another valuable aspect to remark is 
that the swapping factor S can offer an improvement in the range of input values of the 
initial PRBG algorithm. In cryptography, this means an enhancement in security and it can 
be obtained straight from the fact that S, considered as a constant value, may represent a 
new free parameter in the key-space. 
 
Let us consider that the useful values of S could range in the interval S =[1,n], where n is the 
number of bits generated. Taking n for a typical value of 1 Mill. of bits, this would enlarge 
the key space calculated last example. Following analogous calculations and S taking integer 
values, then [S] =1000000 , K = K=KλX× KλY×Kx0×Ky0×KP×KS.  This increases the key size from 
93 to 113 for single precision and from 209 to 229 for double. The enlargement of the key 
space makes the swapped algorithm stronger against brute force attack than the non 
swapped one. 
b) Statistical testing 
The interesting point about the symmetry-swap, is that no matter what number of 
consecutive iterations and swaps are performed to the system, the chaotic behavior always 
prevails. Logically, this particular fact will make pseudorandomness to prevail too. 
 
The authors explore the construction of a swapped PRBG. this is,  following algorithm in 
Fig. 3 with system A and adding a constant swapping factor of value S in the input. Ten 
pseudo-random binary sequences are generated with the same characteristics (initial 
conditions and length) as the ones described in Table 5. A swapping factor of S = 90 is 
applied for sequences to be tested with Diehard test suite. To illustrate a different value, a 
swapping factor of S = 50 is chosen with NIST’s suite. The sequences of the swapped PRBGs 
demonstrate similar random results when submitted to the tests. Very similar Pmin values to 
those in Table 5, or even the same, are obtained in all cases. Fig. 9 shows graphically the 
results obtained and illustrated the success of the tests. Unsurprisingly, this demonstrates 
that in this case the symmetry-swap maintains pseudo randomness. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. In (a), p-values obtained with all tests of Diehard suite for initial conditions S1, S2, S3 
and S4 with P = PDmin and S = 90. In (b) the proportion of sub-sequences that pass NIST test 
suite with initial conditions S1, P =PNmin and S = 50. In (c) The distribution of p-values for 
each test with the same conditions of (b) demonstrates the required uniformity. 
 
In addition, one may think that the introduction of a swapping factor S can be applied in 
multiple ways. Consider, for example, different values of S used alternatively in the process, 
this may make the swapping factor many dimensional. Another way could be to consider an 
S value variable in time. The swapping factor can also offer an easy feedback mechanism, 
when making its value dependable of the output. Therefore the symmetry-swap mechanism 
is a very flexible tool. In the end, it can be observed that the symmetry-swap offers a 
remarkable advantage, while maintaining speed and simplicity of the initial PRBG 
algorithm. 
 
To conclude, the symmetry swap mechanism represents an interesting strategy for finding 
additional degrees of freedom in the key space with no extra computational costs. This is 
possible thanks to the symmetric and geometric properties observed in the chaotic attractor. 
Unlike what happens when introducing the sampling factor P, the swapping factor S 
doesn’t force the designer to consider a trade-off between its range of values and the speed 
of the algorithm. Moreover this degree of freedom can be introduced in multiple ways. 
Therefore the swapping factor S can increase the security of the system with great flexibility. 
4. Conclusion and perspectives 
 
Chaotic cryptography has experienced significant development since its birth in the early 
90’s. Nevertheless, as other interdisciplinary areas of research, it has encountered many 
difficulties in its way through. Chaotic cryptographers have been censured by conventional 
cryptographers of a lack of deep knowledge in cryptography. 
 
Chaotic cryptography appears as an applied branch of non-linear dynamical systems. Initial 
works were discussed in the area of applied cryptology (Dachselt & Schwarz, 2001; Amigó, 
2009) but soon demonstrated low security or performance, being discarded before long. 
Since then, numerous cryptosystems have been proposed, many still lacking of thorough 
security and efficiency analysis or difficult to implement in practice. This has damaged the 
image of chaotic cryptography in the cryptographic community. 
 
Nevertheless hard work has been done to this respect (Alvarez & Li, 2006) and relevant 
aspects have been identified as important in the process of designing good chaotic 
cryptosystems. As a consequence, there are a series of guidelines to assist designers to fulfil 
some basic cryptographic requirements (Alvarez & Li, 2006). They address three main 
issues: implementation, key management and security analysis. Implementation guidelines 
take into account the necessity of a detailed description of the cryptosystem and 
measurements of its performance. Regarding to the key, a complete analysis should be done 
to guaranty the required behaviour of the chaotic algorithm in the key space. This means 
looking for regions of weak keys or windows of non chaotic behaviour, among others. The 
definition of the key and the procedure to build it, should be also clearly specified. 
 
As for the security analysis, the novelty of chaotic cryptography makes difficult a rigorous 
study on the security of these algorithms (Amigó, 2009). As well as it is not yet established a 
general analytical methodology to study non-linear dynamical systems, there is also a lack 
of adequate analysis tools to assess the behaviour of these systems as part of the 
cryptographic algorithm. In this case, conventional cryptography tools cannot be directly 
applied to chaotic cryptographic algorithms. This is another reason why these totally new 
schemes seem doubtful to conventional cryptographers. 
 
However, lessons have been learnt and the work done in this area (Alvarez et al, 2011) is 
giving a series of mathematical tools to assess the security of the algorithms. Chaotic 
cryptoanalysis works show examples of the tools used to assess security and the details of 
their realization. The analysis of the dynamical properties of the systems as the bifurcation 
diagrams and the Lyapunov’s exponents is considered a basic security analysis. These tools 
allow the designer to discover regions of the parameters of design where the chaotic system 
shows windows of periodic behaviour. Furthermore a study of the statistical characteristics 
of the cryptosystem must be recommended. This is done, through the study of the 
histograms looking for uniformity in the distribution of ciphertexts and calculating for 
different values of the parameters the entropy of the orbits and the statistical complexity. 
 
Today chaotic cryptography remains a very active field, with many publications in different 
areas of modern cryptography. This interdisciplinary approach has been quite successful in 
pseudo random number generation. But it is still in the side of chaotic cryptography to 
develop the necessary analytical tools and prove the compliance of the required standards. 
 
The chapter concludes here. It has intended to give a vision of what chaotic cryptography is 
and a comprehensive example of the techniques used in this field. This example gathers a 
series of topics considered of interest in the field of chaotic cryptography, such as digital 
chaotic cryptosystems, chaos based Pseudo-Random Bit Generation (PRBG) and the use of 
chaotic two-dimensional maps. It also covers a detailed explanation of its implementation 
and describes the measurements performed to assess its performance characteristics. This 
provides a display of how digital chaotic cryptosystems are built and the tools used in this 
area to evaluate their quality. Additionally it is presented a mechanism that illustrates how 
the geometry characteristics of the chaotic attractors can be used to improve the security of 
the cryptographic algorithm.  
 
The authors would like to leave a final remark. This is that, though chaotic cryptography 
may be considered at present peripheral in circles of conventional crypto, chaotic number 
generation may have attractive applications as simulation engines in computational science 
(Pellicer-Lostao & Lopez-Ruiz, (2011c). Chaos based number generators are easy to use and 
highly configurable. This makes them a valuable tool for this application. 
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